Summary. Diversification, a central issue in the study of capital allocation, has much to do with symmetries and asymmetries in the distribution of asset returns. A diversified portfolio imposes symmetry on the allocation vector in order to balance out much of the asymmetries in the returns vector.
It has long been noted that symmetries can be exploited to learn more about optimality in portfolio allocation decisions. Symmetries can be employed in many ways when specifying the problem. For instance, independence among returns imposes a very restrictive form of symmetry on stochastic interactions. The classical CAPM model, due to Sharpe (1964) among others, imposes the assumption of multivariate normality so that all uni-dimensional marginals are symmetric up to location and scale parameters and all stochastic interactions are also linear in form. Samuelson (1967a Samuelson ( , 1967b , Brumelle (1974) , Hadar, Russell and Seo (1977) , McEntire (1984) , Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) , Kijima and Ohnishi (1996) , Kijima (1997) , and Lapan and Hennessy (2001) have all identified symmetries of various forms and strengths that are necessary, sufficient, or both when seeking to assert something about the optimal allocation vector for a risk averse expected utility maximizing investor.
Our concern with this literature is that, while insightful, rigorous, and ultimately of undoubted assistance to financial practitioners, the literature has not broached the issue of symmetry head-on.
Mathematics has developed a variety of tools, particularly those arising from group and majorization theories, that are well suited to modeling symmetry and departures from symmetry. These tools have found widespread uses in other disciplines, such as physics and chemistry.
In economics explicit use of group theory has been confined to a few topics, such as Saari's (e.g., 2000a Saari's (e.g., , 2000b ) work on voting theory, and studies by Sato (1976) , Russell and Farris (1998) and others on duality in production and consumption. Majorization tools, which have a somewhat indirect group theoretic underpinning, have found a limited but growing variety of uses in economics. The baseline form of majorization has been applied in work by Atkinson (1970) on social equity, work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) on the welfare and comparative statics effects of risk, and work by Salant and Shaffer (1999) on heterogeneity in oligopoly. Chambers and Quiggin (2000) have engaged a generalized weighted extension of majorization in a variety of contexts concerning the theory of the firm when facing endogenous production uncertainty.
Given the natural symmetries embodied in the structure of the portfolio allocation problem, it would seem that the problem should be as amenable, if not more so, to the mathematical tools that have been designed to model symmetries. This paper will demonstrate that, even using basic concepts in group and majorization theories, much can be established about optimal fund allocation vectors. After first characterizing our specification of the portfolio problem, we will present the tools that will be used. The first analysis section, Section 4, applies a variant of majorization to identify the property of transitivity in a permutation group as sufficient to motivate complete diversification in a risk averter's portfolio. Given the wide variety of investment opportunities that are now typically available to investors in developed economies, it would be convenient to understand when a partial analysis, i.e., involving a subset of those opportunities, does not mis-represent the problem. Section 5 shows the utility of point-wise stabilizer groups in this regard.
Sections 6 and 7 introduce location and scale asymmetries, in addition to incompleteness in the symmetries among the sources of risk. By way of majorization under group operations and use of revealed preference arguments, we develop sets of linear inequalities that an optimal allocation vector must satisfy. We show how the resulting linear programming problem might be of use to practicing financial professionals. Section 8 demonstrates the particular convenience of reflection groups when applying revealed preference arguments. It is shown that, regardless of what else a group does, if a group element folds the distribution of risks back on itself such that the only difference between one set of assets and the reflected set is given by location parameters along a ray then the allocations are ordered as intuition would suggest. A corresponding inference is also valid when the source of differentiation arise from scale, rather than location, parameters. The paper concludes with some conjectures on strengthening our findings.
Portfolio allocation problem
A von-Neumann & Morgenstern expected utility maximizing investor has a fixed amount of wealth, say $1, available to invest at time 0. She allocates it between available investment assets that provide n time 1 gross returns per $ invested in opportunity, . The optimization $ x i i 0 {1, 2, . . . , n} ' O n problem (P) may be represented as 1 Throughout, we will write vectors horizontally in order to conserve on space and notation.
2 Emphasizing the algebraic nature of our approach, our analysis will have no need for the usual smoothness assumptions on .
2) with and . 1 The '@' notation refers to the P a ' (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) S ' {P a :
usual inner product operation. At present we assume that the vector of gross returns, , is non-P x negative, i.e., . The expectation operator, , is with respect to the probability measure of
over the distribution . The conditions on suffice to ensure the existence of a solution to (P).
F(P x ) S
Our exclusive concern is with developing inferences on the ordinal and cardinal properties of solution vectors, , to problem (P). We identify by the set of agents solving (P) who have a monotone P a ( U is symmetric in the sense that then one might expect that .
, and then one might expect that .
, and then one might expect that
However, problems such as these become considerably more involved when . To start with, n > 2 there are ways of interchanging n arguments and the sorts of symmetries that might n! F(x 1 , x 2 ) possess also increases in a near exponential manner with the value of n. More importantly, unlike the symmetry assumption , the sorts of symmetries that may arise when need
n > 2 not be reflections across a bisector. This is problematic because an analysis based on comparisons before and after reflections is often the most convenient line of approach. Fortunately, there exists a large body of mathematical tools that are quite well-suited for posing and systematically analyzing generalized versions of allocation order conjectures such as the three provided above. The goal of this paper is to bring these tools to an analysis of allocative order in the portfolio allocation problem.
Methodological preliminaries
Our interest in this paper is in the implications of symmetry for portfolio choice. One of the most general mathematical frameworks for characterizing symmetries is group theory. A related framework, one which places partial order on asymmetries between vectors, is generalized majorization theory.
We will employ both, and this section describes the principal tools that will be applied.
Groups
A group is a set of operations that satisfies four convenient properties. 
The size of a group, the order, is given by the cardinality of set G. The sub-structure of a group is 3 It is for no other reason than presentation that the tilde is omitted when referencing the symmetric group, . Sym(O n ) 4 In fact, by the Lagrange theorem, the order of any subgroup must divide the order of the group. And so a subgroup of the symmetries of cannot be of an order other than 1, 2, 3, or 6. F(x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ) 5 typically important when seeking to understand the group's implications.
Definition 3.2.
A subgroup of group is a subset, H, of set G that generates a group under thẽ HG same operation *.
Notice that a group is a set of operations, and should not be confused with the set of objects on which it might act. In this paper, groups will act on a set of random variables by permuting the positions of these random variables in a multivariate distribution function. Because it is, perhaps, easiest to illustrate the concept of a group with reference to how it permutes objects, and because this is how we intend to apply groups, we will present the idea of a permutation group before providing some illustrations. (the identity map) and where the latter would be the symmetry group of 3 objects. 4 To 3! ' 6 characterize a distribution with that order of symmetry, start with any primitive distribution 5 Here, means that the first argument maps to the second and the second back to the first.
(1,2) Argument 3 is omitted because it is the convention in cycle notation not to list arguments that are fixed under the group element. Similarly, is to be read as the statement that the first argument g 5 ' ( 1,3,2) maps to the third, the third to the second, and the second back to the first. Generally, is the map of g(i )
the i th object in under . For example, implies , , and
6 When interpreting the table, read as after whereby and .
Representing the elements of the group in cycle notation, we have as the identity element, e , , , , .
The group may be written in the form of a Cayley table as follows 
By construction, distribution as given in (3.1) above is symmetric in any one of the group
operations. Now let us take the cyclic subgroup of , so called because it cycles the three Sym (O 3 ) objects. Labeled , it is comprised of , , and . We may construct ã
distribution function that is symmetric, or invariant, under its elements as where is an arbitrary distribution. The Cayley table iŝ A function that is symmetric under the elements of group is said to be -invariant so that GG function in (3.2) is -invariant. Clearly, is a subgroup of because , as given
in (3.1), is invariant under while is of lower order than . This particular subgroup C 3C3 Sym(O 3 ) 8 In cycle notation, is to be read as the pair of disjoint cycles and . g 2 ' ( 1,3)(2,4) 1 : 3 2 : 4 8 retains a property of the symmetric group that will be of some importance in the present work. In both cases, the objects of the set orbit through the whole set, i.e., for any of the there exists an element x i of the group that will map the into any other . That is, both groups are transitive. These include the cyclic group of order four, . Indeed, any cyclic group is transitive as ã C 4 consideration of will illustrate. In it, the four elements are , , ,
and . 8 To confirm transitivity, consider the second argument in a function. The group g 3 ' ( 1, 4 , 3, 2 ) maps , , , and .
The group with elements , , , and such
that the Cayley table is Here the non-identity group element is , as in Example 3.1. The intransitivity is due to the g 1 ' ( 1, 2 ) absence of subgroup elements for the maps , , , or . The orbits of x 1 6 x 3 x 2 6 x 3 x 3 6 x 1 x 3 6 x 2 x 1 and are common, but this orbit is disjoint from that of .
Majorization
Our concern is with realizations of vectors and . Mudholkar (1966) 
and b)
. Then vector is said to majorize vector .
Diversification
Before we establish our first main result, a lemma will prove to be both useful and insightful.
The lemma asserts that the optimal allocation vector of a risk averter is in the convex hull of the orbit of any under the group of symmetries of the distribution function. Choosing an arbitrary P a 0 S , we may eliminate any without further consideration as a candidate for optimality. Note P a 0 S P bGš P a that the larger the order of the group the more discriminating the pre-order tends to be. For example,
with quite large suppose that the only symmetry on is the transposition . Then the n F(P x ) x 1 : x 2 lemma can be viewed as generating convex hulls on an subset of the dimensional simplex . . If the -invariant group for is transitive on , then
The equality arises from a simple application of the group majorization implications for concave functions that underpins Proposition 4. 
then one may not be sure that under all . All that can be ascertained from P a
Separability in allocation
The question that we address in this section is the nature of the stochastic environment such that we can be sure how an optimizing agent allocates funds among a subset of all available opportunities. To do this, we need a sort of symmetric connectedness within the subset and, again, transitivity will do. We also need a form of conditional independence between subsets. The point-wise stabilizer subgroup suffices in this regard. 
is transitive with respect to set , then . 
group of the i th set in the partition. Let be a subgroup of . If the group of symmetries, ,
is given by , and if each is transitive with respect to set , 
Location shifts
By contrast with the preceding sections, where asymmetries involved incompleteness in the symmetries of , this section and the section to follow will introduce and parameterize a second source of F(P x ) asymmetries between asset returns. In this section each of the random variables in is held to have P x zero mean, but the true return is given by . Thus, location asymmetries are given by P x % P r , P r 0 ú n % differences in the coordinate values of . There remain also asymmetries that arise due to a small P r order, i.e., less than , on the permutation group invariances of .
n! F(P x )
While attention in this section will be confined to investors, and while we are now U(·) 0 U
( 1 dealing with a new source of asymmetry, the notion of a convex hull remains central to our approach and to an understanding of our findings.
Proposition 6.1. Let
, and let where the are scalars and is the
group of symmetries on . Then . 
(6.1) Example 6.3. A comparison of Examples 6.1 and 6.2 is instructive. Observe that *C 3 * ' 3 < 6 '
. There is less symmetry to exploit in the cyclic group than in the corresponding symmetric *Sym(O 3 )* group, and so the deductions concerning the optimal allocation vector should be no stronger.
Constraint set (6.1) does not allow us to assert that , and the partial nature of the ranking under a ( r 1 , r 2 ,r 3 ) r i group generates a total ordering on the allocation vector. Notice too that, whatever in Sym(O 3 )G Proposition 6.1, the generated inequalities must bound the candidate allocation . This is P a , and this is least restrictive when . This generates the bound .
2 ' 1 And we also have the bound . Together with the non-negativity constraints, these bounds a invariant. It can be seen that completing the symmetries shaves off two parts of the feasible set; namely below the diagonal but where , and above the diagonal but where . a
Example 6.4. For a 4-variate distribution function, suppose that the only symmetry is given by the reflection through the pair of hyperplanes and so that
. For then, together with the non-negativity constraints,
( r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 , r 4 ) ' ( 1 , 3 ,4 , 5 ) the only non-trivial bound is .
Combining techniques employed in propositions 5.1 and 6.1, some work reveals the separability result Proposition 6.2. Let , and let . For the group of symmetries, , on 
Scale effects
Whereas the focus of the last section was on the first moments of asset returns, we now seek a better understanding of how asymmetries in the second central moments of asset returns affect the allocation vector. To do so, we assume that mean returns are asset invariant, i.e., , and we r i 'r oe i 0 O n represent the magnitude of univariate risks faced by a vector of dispersion coefficients, . Univariate P s returns are given by . Defining , we may write portfolio returns as
To exploit any group symmetries, , on , we define the vector
The construct is of interest because the weightings normalize to generate an iso-risk contour for 1 /s i returns distributions that are invariant under . To see this, let and writẽ
where the last inequality is due to the invariance of . But , when viewed as an allocatioñ
vector, may not be feasible.
To develop an understanding of what are and are not feasible, and what choices reveal about
feasibility, observe that, by construction, is feasible. For future reference, [P a P s ,g / (P a P s ,g · P 1 )] · P 1 / 1 define with . Returning to (7.2), and evaluating at the group identity,
it is clear that , and in particular that . To ensure feasibility, re-scale the P a P s ,e · P 1 ' '
risk in (7.3) and evaluate at optimum choices to obtain Because and portfolio mean is invariant to the group operation, we must have
. Relation asserts that no other allocation vector on the
orbit of is as well diversified as . Were this inequality not true, then the risk averse portfolio P a ( P s ,e P a ( P s ,e allocator would have optimized over available choices.
Proposition 7.1. Let , let , and define as in (7.2) above.
For the group of symmetries, , on , the optimal allocation vector must satisfy 
application of the budget constraint delivers the constraint set , , and a
together with the non-negativity assumptions. 4 a
Example 7.2. Consider, as in Example 6.2, the cyclic group on distribution . This
time however, let and . Employing budget constraint P r 'r × P 1 (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ) ' (1 , 2, 3 )
, as well as the two inequalities generated by the revealed preference deduction a
, we have the portfolio allocation bounds P a
(7.5)
Together with the assumption that , these bounds are depicted in Figure 2 . It is readily a ( 3 > 0 demonstrated that the bounds in Example 7.1 are tighter in that the admissible set for the optimal allocation vector is a subset of that identified in Figure 2 . As in Example 6.3, this is because is ã C 3 sub-group of . Sym(O 3 )
It is also possible to establish a separability analog to the proposition.
Corollary 7.1. Let , let , and define as in (7.2) above.
From the group of symmetries, , on , establish the point-wise stabilizer of , .
The optimal allocation vector must satisfy .
To ascertain the truth of this statement, observe that the order of the group tightens the bounds in Proposition 7.1. One is free, for the sake of convenience in analysis, to concentrate attention on subsets of the available investment opportunities. At, possibly, some loss in the strength of the bounds, the point-wise stabilizer subgroup can be used to draw attention to sectoral allocations. 
implication has already been established in Example 7.1.
Reflection groups
Let where and where . Among group operations,
, on those such that , and such that, without further loss of generality, the
ordering of sets is preserved under the bijection, are particularly convenient for study. This is because reflections allow ready comparisons of evaluations through exploiting the separating hyperplane (i.e., a set of bisectors) along which the distribution function may be folded. In what is to follow, we will exploit such reflection subgroups for asset distributions that are differentiated by group symmetries on the distribution function of risk sources and also by location and scale vectors within the utility function. When there are reflection group symmetries on the distribution of randomness in returns, the consequences of both Proposition 6.1 and Proposition 7.1 may be strengthened. The approach is to apply these propositions, and then pair off each argument with its reflection. and , then such that . 
Conclusion
The intent of this paper has been to formalize, in a general manner, the modeling of asymmetries in the asset returns environment countenanced by an investor so as to better understand the ordinal and cardinal structure of the allocation vector. We readily acknowledge that our analysis is far from definitive, and we conclude with some conjectures concerning extensions.
Normal subgroups allow a factoring, or decomposition, of groups into groups of more manageable order. It is primarily for this reason that the subgroups of this form are central to many of the most important applications of group theory. They also possess strong relations with stabilizer groups.
Perhaps portfolio separability results such as Proposition 5.1 and Corollary 5.1 could be extended if relevant subgroups were assumed to be normal? A second conjecture pertains to an alternative approach to developing asymmetries in the returns distributions. Majorization with respect to a group provides a non-parametric treatment of asymmetries whereas the extension to include location and scale asymmetries in the marginals gives a parametric flavor to the latter part of our analysis. One might view the parameter vectors as an intuitive approach concreteness, to parameterize asymmetries. There exists a literature on using groups to "build" objects such as functions (Brown, 1989; Ronan, 1989) . In the case of a bivariate distribution, Kijima and Ohnishi (1996) and Lapan and Hennessy (2001) have used the most elementary group, reflection through a line, to appended a functional asymmetry to a distribution function such that order could be induced on the optimal portfolio allocation. Perhaps, after some thought, this constructive approach may be extended to the -variate context? The key may be to recognize the reflection operation as n one that exploits the existence of a separating hyperplane, and to initiate a systematic approach to studying the consequences of separated convex sets. These sets might be in a parameter space, as in this paper, or where the elements are distribution functions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1: The main thrust of this result is a special case of a finding due to León and Proschan (1979) 
Jensen's inequality, , and the invariances under we have
implies that is weakly preferred over any . Next observe that is
convex. is closed under convex combinations and .S P a (˜G P a oe P a 0 S Proof of Proposition 4.1: From Lemma 4.1, we know that the optimum is in the convex hull of the orbit under the group operations of all allocation vectors. Transitivity implies that there is just one orbit.
Denote the convex hull of vector under group by . Now P aG C[P a ;G ]
because is inside the convex hull of and is outside the convex hull of .
Finally, because is a singleton and no convex hull C[(1 /n) P 1 ;G ] f C[P a;G ] oe P a 0 S C[(1 /n) P 1 ;G ]
can be interior to it. Therefore, .P a ( ' (1 / n) P 1
Proof of Proposition 5.1: Because fixes all we may apply Lemma 4.1, but wherẽ where the equality is due to group symmetries and the inequality is due to the fact that has been P a ( revealed to be weakly preferred over . But, due to group symmetries, P a 
Proof of Proposition 8.1.
Part a):
Under the nonidentity element , using (A.5) above we will identify conditions under g 0 H
which
. This latter inequality may be expressed as P a ( @ P r $ P a 
